Should Supporting a Football Team be Protected as a Philosophical Belief?

This article examines whether support for a football club should amount to a philosophical belief protected under section 10 of the Equality Act 2010. The question is explored through McClung v Doosan Babcock Ltd, where the Employment Tribunal held that loyalty to Rangers Football Club did not meet the threshold established in Grainger plc v Nicholson. The decision found that the claimant’s fandom, though sincere, lacked the depth, seriousness, and moral significance required for legal protection. This essay critically analyses that reasoning, arguing that the tribunal’s application of the Grainger criteria reflects a subjective interpretation of equality law shaped by broader social and cultural assumptions about what constitutes a legitimate belief.

Grainger plc v Nicholson established that philosophical beliefs must be of a “similar nature” to religious beliefs. This interpretation was confirmed by Baroness Scotland, during the passage of the Equality Bill, who explained that “the term ‘philosophical belief’ will take its meaning from the context in which it appears … as part of legislation relating to discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief. Given that context, philosophical beliefs must therefore always be of a similar nature to religious beliefs.”

The case set out five key criteria for determining whether a belief qualifies for protection: it must (i) be genuinely held, (ii) be a belief rather than an opinion or viewpoint based on the present state of information, (iii) concern a weighty and substantial aspect of human life and behaviour, (iv) attain a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion, and importance, (adopted from Campbell and Cosans v United Kingdom)  and (v) be worthy of respect in a democratic society, compatible with human dignity, and with the fundamental rights of others. Therefore, the question before the courts is not whether football is a religion, but whether it functions in a similar way, carrying the depth, seriousness, and significance of religious belief.

The Grainger criteria have been interpreted and applied in McClung v Doosan Babcock Ltd. The first criterion, that the belief must be genuinely held, is not discussed as it was not in dispute that Mr McClung’s football fandom was sincere, as with compatibility with human dignity and the rights of others, which were also accepted.

In applying the second Grainger criterion, the tribunal drew on McClintock v Department of Constitutional Affairs, where a magistrate’s objections to same-sex adoption were found to be based on opinion rather than belief, and McEleny v MOD, which concerned pro-independence political views. It used these cases to conclude that support for a football team, like membership of a political party, reflects preference rather than belief in a coherent philosophy. This reasoning overlooks extensive sociological and anthropological evidence demonstrating that football fandom is a more comprehensivesystem of meaning.

Clifford Geertz’s conception of religion as a “cultural system” is particularly useful here. He argues that religion operates through networks of symbols that establish shared moods and motivations, shaping how people interpret and act in the world. Viewed through this lens, football fandom closely resembles religion. Club colours, crests, chants, and slogans create a symbolic network linking individual identity with the collective. Match days and communal gatherings function like ritual practices reinforcing this shared order. In this way, supporting a club provides “a general order of existence”: belonging, moral coherence, and emotional stability that shape how individuals experience the world.

Sandvoss similarly argues that football fandom mediates the relationship between individuals and society. Drawing on Anderson’s idea of nations as “imagined communities,” he observes that fans, like citizens, rarely know one another personally, yet “in the minds of each lives the image of their communion.” Football fans imagine themselves as members of a collective whole, bound by shared identity, memory, and emotion. Through this, they locate themselves within broader moral and cultural narratives. Thus, football, though part of everyday life, functions as a belief system that provides belonging, routine, and a shared moral story.

Jirásek develops this further, describing sport as a form of “implicit religion”, through which people encounter transcendence in everyday life. Rooted in mythic traditions, sport occupies a space associated with sacred experience.Research suggests that many sports, including football, originated from rituals performed during religious festivals,reinforcing the deep historical and symbolic continuity between football and spirituality.

In a postmodern context where truth is subjective and religion increasingly personal, Albayrak and colleagues argue that manifestations of holiness now appear “everywhere human initiative exists.” Secular holiness emerges as individuals ascribe sacred value to what brings them meaning and belonging. Football exemplifies this shift: through its symbolic and communal functions, it transforms the ordinary into the sacred, offering transcendence without religion. Fans also experience this transformation through what Durkheim called “collective effervescence,” the surge of shared emotion and unity felt when people gather for a common purpose. In the stadium, this is seen in the synchronised energy of the crowd, which turns individuals into a single, powerful collective often described as feeling “electric.”

Together, these perspectives demonstrate that football embodies the structure and experience of religion in secular form. Far from being a matter of preference or opinion, fandom operates as a system of meaning through which individuals interpret the world and guide their conduct. If sport fulfils the same existential function as religion, there is no principled reason to deny it similar protection under the law.

The decision was that the claimant’s enthusiasm was personally significant but not of wider moral or philosophical importance. Comparing Conisbee v Crossley Farms Ltd, where vegetarianism was deemed a lifestyle choice rather than a protected belief. Arguing that both lack cohesive philosophical convictions is arguably misguided. To do so ignores the deep sense of loyalty, duty, identity, and community that can make attachment to a club feel like no choice at all.

The judgment drew a distinction between fandom and veganism, as recognised in Casamitjana Costa v League Against Cruel Sports, yet the two are more alike than the court allowed. Just as a person who feels a moral duty to non-human species does not merely choose to be vegan but feels compelled by moral conviction, many fans experience their allegiance as meaningful and necessary. As Alan Edge wrote of his Liverpool childhood, “Liverpudlian or Evertonian; Anfield or Goodison; Red or Blue. You did not choose. It chose you.” Like this, Mr McClung’s family passed down their support for Rangers through generations. Such allegiance is not a pastime but a formative part of social and cultural inheritance.

If religion’s cultural power lies in making meaning real through shared symbols and ritual, football performs that same function in secular modernity. Its chants, colours, and collective gatherings bring communal identity to life. In this sense, football is not only a mirror of society but a power that actively shapes it. By ignoring this, the tribunal failed to appreciate that fandom concerns “a weighty and substantial aspect of human life and behaviour.”

Applying the fourth Grainger criterion, the tribunal concluded that support for Rangers lacked “cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance,” drawing parallels with Lisk v Shield Guardian Co Ltd, where wearing a poppy was regarded as a sentimental act rather than a coherent belief system. This comparison is misplaced. Football fandom is sustained by deep-rooted rituals, loyalty, and belonging that reflect a degree of cohesion far exceeding a single symbolic gesture.

Following Gray v Mulberry Company (Design) Ltd, the tribunal insisted that the claimant’s belief be narrowly defined before assessing protection. This led to a reductive definition of “being a supporter of Rangers Football Club,” stripping away the moral and communal dimensions of his fandom. The tribunal also misunderstood the meaning of the “Everyone–Anyone Rangers FC Charter,” treating its emphasis on diversity as a sign that the belief lacked coherence, rather than recognising it as the encouragement of inclusivity typical of many belief systems.

As Webber observes, football has evolved into a phenomenon of “global, national, and everyday life,” interwoven with politics, diplomacy, and economics. Its reach extends far beyond entertainment, functioning as an industry, a cultural language, and a political medium. Beck describes football in 1930s Britain, deliberately used as an instrument of soft power, projecting democratic values in an age of dictatorship and serving as a form of cultural dialogue through which nations expressed ideology and power.

Far from lacking importance, football operates as a stage where values such as fairness, solidarity, and justice are enacted and contested. Biel and colleagues describe it as a cultural phenomenon fostering political belonging and “more inclusive understandings of Europe.” Its ability to transcend national boundaries gives it a powerful cohesive function in public life. Finger and colleagues similarly argue that football promotes social cohesion across boarders by fostering “regular, peaceful, rule-bound contact” between citizens of diverse backgrounds. Football fandom in these cases clearly demonstrates the coherence and depth required by the Grainger criteria.

Written By : Hannah Morgan ( Legal Researcher, Street Law)